Nigeria’s Foreign Policy and the Challenge of the AES Sub-region: The Dilemma of What Future?
Bola A. Akinterinwa
Regional integration is being promoted by sub-regional integration with the withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in West Africa as at today. The withdrawal makes it the second time Francophone countries would withdraw from the regional body. Mauritania was the first to formally withdraw from the ECOWAS on 28th December, 2000, and by so doing, reducing the membership of the organisation from 16 to 15.
With the notice of immediate withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, on 28 January 2024, from the ECOWAS, the establishment of a confederation on 6 July, 2024, and with their public declaration of no returning to the ECOWAS again, it is clear that they are not only anti-France but also anti-ECOWAS henceforth. By implication, the ECOWAS is now left with twelve original members. And true enough, the withdrawal has led to the establishment of a confederation, the origin of which is traceable to the defence and security pact done on 16 September 2023, called Alliance des Etats du Sahel (AES), meaning the Alliance of Sahel States (ASS). The ASS is a direct resultant from the ECOWAS 7-day ultimatum given to Niger Republic on Sunday. July 30. 2023 and which expired on August 6, 2023.
It can also be argued that the fear of the ultimatum created the fear of unpredictability of the ECOWAS that prompted the ASS to acquire military weapons in preparation for self-defence. The ASS does not want to be cut unawares. And true enough, the establishment of the ASS creates a dilemma for Nigeria’s foreign policy in various ways. In this regard, should Nigeria, as the initiator of the ECOWAS, and the most important sustaining member, afford the luxury of accommodating the dismantlement of the organisation? If yes, what are the implications and how should they be dealt with? If no, how should foreign policy address the issue? What does Africa as centrepiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy mean in light of the ASS?
Foreign Policy Challenges
The first and most critical challenge is the preaching of Africa as centrepiece of foreign policy, but without walking the talk, which reminds of James Ngugi’s Weep Not Child. James Ngugi, who not only changed his name in 1970 to Ngugi wa Thiong’o and decided not to write in English language but in his native Gikuyu, in rejection of neo-colonialism, said a White man is always a White man, but a Black man is never a Black man. The situation in Nigeria is not in any way different. It was Nigeria that proclaimed herself as Africa’s defender and protector. It was Nigeria that chose to protect black dignity. In fact, Nigeria played host to the FESTAC 77, that is, the Second World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture, held from 15 January 1977 to 12 February 1977.
In Nigeria that sponsored FESTAC ‘77, policy makers promote internationalism to the detriment of pan-Africanism. For example, ECOWAS policy makers, especially Nigerian diplomats, often make policy analysis difficult by unnecessarily considering West Africa as a sub-region. This is most unfortunate, because, in 1991, African leaders redefined Africa as a region for the purposes of fast-tracking continental integration. It divided the existing African region into five regions but many Nigerian diplomatists and eminent scholars still join Western scholars to refer to West Africa as a sub-region. By so doing, they undermine the developmental efforts of African leaders. It is important to underscore that West Africa is no more a sub-region in the context of African scholarship, but a region (vide Article 1(d) and (e) of the 1991 Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community.
This clarification is a desideratum in light of the ASS which is not a region but a sub-region within West Africa or within the ECOWAS region. As such, the ASS is the first sub-region to be created within the framework of the 1991 Abuja Treaty. It is against this background that Nigeria’s foreign policy and the challenges of the ASS are raised here for the purposes of addressing what future?
In dealing with Nigeria’s attitudinal disposition towards the ASS, there is the need to differentiate between the domestic and external challenges. The domestic challenges bother essentially on the foreign policies of non-alignment and national interest; the Bolaji Akinyemi doctrine of consultation; foreign policy concentricism; and constructive and beneficial concentricism. These are the main principles defining Nigeria’s foreign policy behaviour, in general, and towards the ASS, in particular.
As regards non-alignment and national interest, Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa never meant that Nigeria could not align with any bloc or with anyone in his August 20, 1960 foreign policy statement. What he said and meant was that Nigeria’s foreign policy attitude would be determined by Nigeria’s national interest. The problem was and still is how to understand what constitutes Nigeria’s national interests beyond the general core interests of defence of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. More important, who determines the national interest and when is an interest eligible to be considered truly national?
For instance, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (PBAT) is both the leader of Nigeria and the ECOWAS. When is his official policy pronouncement restrictedly that of Nigeria or distinctly that of ECOWAS? The main dynamic of the current imbroglio between the ECOWAS and the ASS is the reported ECOWAS’ zero tolerance for unconstitutional change of Government in the ECOWAS region. In this regard, is democracy also the problem of Nigeria, if it is the problem for the ECOWAS? By the time PBAT threatened to deploy ECOWAS troops to Niger when the Abdourahamane Tiani junta refused to return to democratic rule and release the ousted President Mohammed Bazoum, can it be rightly posited that the ultimatum was in Nigeria’s national interest? If it was not, why should PBAT protect the ECOWAS interest to the detriment of Nigeria’s national interest?
And who says that the defence of ECOWAS interest is not also in Nigeria’s national interest, bearing in mind that the initiation of the ECOWAS, in collaboration with the Republic of Togo, was to nip in the bud any potential sub-regional insecurity? Nigeria had a 3-year war of national unity and General Yakubu Gowon did not want that experience anymore. This factor was responsible for the choice of economic cooperation to discourage belligerency or insurgency in West Africa. And true enough again, Nigeria adopted the functional cooperation approach of the Monrovia school of thought which rejected the Casablanca school’s political kingdom first and all other things shall follow. In other words, the promotion of the ECOWAS as a framework for national and regional development, is very consistent with the functional school. Nigeria needs to reaffirm this policy attitude or redefine it.
As for Professor Bolaji Akinwande Akinyemi’s Consultation Doctrine, it simply requires prior consultation with the Government of Nigeria before any support or understanding from Nigeria can be taken for granted. In other words, no one should expect any particular attitudinal disposition without carrying Nigeria along. In this regard, to what extent is the ASS expected to consult with Nigeria in the foreseeable future? Consultation is not likely to come from Niger in light of Nigeria’s foreign policy towards Niger. Besides, the Niamey-based Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission, established in 1971, was established, not simply to promote cooperation in various areas, but particularly to contain whatever misunderstanding or dispute that might arise.
It is within this framework that Nigeria has been supplying electricity to some parts of Niger. When Nigeria discontinued electricity supply to Niger, was it in Nigeria’s interest? Do we need prior consultation from anyone before electricity disconnection? If Niger opted to consult with Nigeria when the ECOWAS gave an ultimatum, would Nigeria have reckoned with the consultation or rejected it? Whose consultation would have been most appropriate: France, European or any Francophone African country?
As regards foreign policy concentricism and constructive and beneficial concentricism, Professor Ibrahim Agboola Gambari advocated the prioritisation of Nigeria’s foreign policy areas in his foreign policy concentricism which divided the whole world into four concentric circles. In the innermost circle are Nigeria and the immediate neighbours. The neighbours are included because of the consideration that Nigeria’s national security is intertwined with that of the immediate neighbours. Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, CON, agreed with Professor Gambari but argued that prioritisation of the operational areas may not be enough without first of all articulating the interests to be pursued in each prioritised foreign policy circle. As noted by Ambassador Adeniji, concentricism should be constructive in design and beneficial to the people of Nigeria in outcome. In this context of the ASS, where should the ASS sub-region be situated in the existing four concentric circles? The ASS, like Mauritania, is no longer part of the ECOWAS, but still belongs to West Africa. Or should the ASS be redefined as the sixth region of Africa and the Caribbean as the seventh? This is a major foreign policy challenge.
External Challenges and Quo Vadis
The external challenges are more critical because neither Nigeria nor the ECOWAS has the power or the monopoly to lay claim to exclusive regional influence. West Africa is a regional space over which the United States, France and Nigeria have been wielding politico-economic influence. In fact, Nigeria has always been the most regional influential in the West African region. The critical challenge now, however, is how to manage the competing influences in the region, especially with the growing influence of Russia.
First, the ASS has compelled the declaration of France as non-grata and the same is true of the United States. When the crisis began, President Emmanuel Macron miscalculated by still behaving as a colonial power, ignoring the people’s hostility to the grandeur de la France as initiated by former President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. Giscard d’Estaing wanted a greater France that would be made possible by the supply of raw materials from Africa, supply of financial resources by the West, and joint administration of Africa’s economic growth and development by a triumvirate of France, the United States and African leaders. The people of Africa are no longer showing any appreciation of this policy.
The opposition elements in the ASS countries often complained about abuse of power by their governments but to which France always turned blind eyes. France always supported her incumbent surrogates in power. The Senegalese opposition complaints are a case in point. This situation is one major rationale pushing Senegal to want to give active support to the position of the ASS, if not join the ASS.
And true enough again, when Mali’s Assimi Go’ta declared the French ambassador to Bamako unwanted, France acted in a holier than thou manner. Again, when France told the coupists in power in Niamey, France said the junta authority was not recognised. The junta responded by cutting off social services to the French embassy and also declared France’s ambassador persona non-grata.
The junta simply showed that France’s non-recognition did not in any way prevent its existence as government enjoying the people’s support. Many French observers, who were close to both the Matignon and the Élysée, gave the impression that France would still come back to the ASS countries through invasion. Whether the invasion is still under plan is not clear, but France’s braggadocio led to the decision to ask for an end to the Franco-Nigerien military cooperation.
The French soldiers were compelled to leave Niger in application of the full sovereignty of the people of Niger. Niger made it clear that it has no animosity vis-à-vis the good people of France, but against the Presidency and Government of France. This was also the explanation of the Senegalese opposition elements before coming to power. The same is true of the United States, but the animosity vis-à-vis the United States was not as critical as that of France, because the way big powers relate with small or medium powers is not different from one another. Their attitude is generally guided by ‘power is right,’ ‘have your say while I have the way.’ This was what the United States attempted to do in Niamey when its delegation went to discuss with the Tchiani junta in Niamey. The US delegation pontificated and the junta was annoyed. It reaffirmed Niger’s sovereignty and the United States was asked to relocate its military bases.
Quoting the American commander, Airforce Major General Kenneth Ekman, on 6 July 2024, the Africanews.com said ‘the U.S. will remove all its forces and equipment from a small base in Niger this weekend and fewer than 500 remaining troops will leave a critical drone base in the West African country in August, ahead of a September 15 deadline set in an agreement with the new ruling junta.’
In this regard, the withdrawal is not really the dilemma for Nigeria but the revelation by the American commander who is serving as the Director of Strategy of the US Africa Command in Stuttgart, Germany and as leader of the withdrawal from the small base at the airport in Niamey and from the larger counter-terrorism larger base in Agadez. Major General Ekman has it that many other West African nations have shown willingness to accommodate the American military bases.
Reportedly, the United States is moving its military bases from Niger to the Côte d’Ivoire. The possibility of Ghana similarly playing host to the military bases has not been ruled out. In this regard, the ECOWAS region has been divided against itself and foreign powers can easily take advantage of the division by using the region as a centre for proxy wars in the foreseeable future. Will Nigeria accept to be used by the United States against Niger, in particular, and the ASS, in general? How will Nigeria’s ties with the Abidjan or Yamoussoukro authorities look like? Nigeria’s bilateral ties have always been fraught with mutual suspicions right from the time of Nigeria’s civil war. The Côte d’Ivoire supported Biafra with much support of French Prime Minister Michel Debré. Nigeria’s relationship with Abidjan under Houphouët Boigny was considered of no effect after the war because of General Gowon’s policy of ‘No Victor, No Vanquished.’ However, the mutual suspicion or friendly enmity is still much there. Besides, the Côte d’Ivoire is on record to have engaged in several policy actions that confronted Nigeria’s and ECOWAS’ foreign policy interests. The role of the Côte d’Ivoire in the CEAO (Communautë Économique de l’Afrique de L’Ouest (West African Economic Community) and ECOWAS-CEAO rivalry. The CEAO eventually was dismantled in favour of the ECOWAS, but there is nothing to suggest that Anglophone and Francophone rivalry within the ECOWAS is yet to be thrown into the garbage of history. The CEAO comprised exclusively Francophone states unlike the ECOWAS of Anglophone, Francophone, and Lusophone countries.
There was also the reported story of how the Côte d’Ivoire under President Alassane Ouattara planned a financial currency coup against the ECOWAS by trying to adopt the name, ‘Eco,’ which was reserved to be the name of the ECOWAS currency in the making, to replace the CFA franc. Much has not been said about the outcome of the attempt. Above all, the African Union and the ECOWAS that purport to have zero tolerance for unconstitutional changes of government in Africa refused to see anything wrong with the manipulation of the Ivoirian constitution to enable President Ouattara to contest and go for a third term with the support of the French. In this case, how does Nigeria want to relate with the Côte d’Ivoire? Can Nigeria be against the Côte d’Ivoire and still remain friendly with France? Will Nigeria join the French-American solidarity against the ASS? Can Nigeria be comfortable with the Russian-backed Niger or Russian-supported ASS? In fact, to what extent is the relevance is PBAT’s doctrine of 4-Ds in the rehabilitation of the ECOWAS? These are some of the elements of the dilemma.
And true enough again, the ASS countries have said the ASS does not intend to return to the ECOWAS. As made crystal clear by Captain Ibrahim Traoré during his visit to Niamey where he not only spoke in French, but also in very pleasant English, language to the admiration of his audiences. He underscored opposition to continued French imperialism, European Union’s policy attitude of double standard towards Africa, and the need for self-reliant development, using their own human and material resources. Thus, the ASS is more concerned with their own sovereignty, with their survival on the basis of self-reliance and without any regard for any supranational directive on the constitutionality or non-constitutionality of change of government. This is the foundation of the dilemma of what future for the ASS.
The dilemma of what future for the ASS and the ECOWAS is how to maintain the AES as a new sub-regional organisation that has to co-exist with the ECOWAS. The co-existence requires reconciling the interests of the ECOWAS as a body corporate with the people’s interests. The ECOWAS talks about intolerance of unconstitutional change of government. The peoples talk about stopping French imperialism and exploitation of their resources for the development of Europe. The people oppose foreign directives on how to develop their countries. Consequently, the problem has nothing to do with democracy but the people’s struggle for self-reliancism. If there is to be any entente cordiale with the ASS, it is citizen diplomacy that appears to be a workable approach, because the problem is at the level of the people who possess the sovereignty. In this regard, diplomacy can begin with the 2nd African Military Games scheduled for November 5-18, 2024 at the Moshood Abiola National Stadium in Abuja. Besides, bilateral ties are not likely to be undermined. The Kano-Maradi railway project, covering 283.75 km and costing $1.96bn cannot but continue. Additionally, the Gur people live in Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana, Togo, Benin and the Côte d’Ivoire. The Yoruba live in Benin and Togo. So do the Ewe in Togo and Ghana, and the Akan in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire. These are the people to be targeted in the ASS countries.
Niger Republic is Nigeria’s friendliest neighbour and the friendly cannot be tainted at the altar of ECOWAS-ASS rivalry. What the ECOWAS should do is to give an observer status to the ASS. The ECOWAS should see the ASS as a catalyst in the regional efforts at integration. And more importantly, more sub-regional groups can be considered, especially that of Nigeria and all her immediate neighbours.
